Volume 8, Issue 1 (5-2026)                   Int. J. Ethics Soc 2026, 8(1): 1-3 | Back to browse issues page


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Eskandari H. Neutrality in Major Social Crises: The Relationship Between Truth, Goodness and Responsibility. Int. J. Ethics Soc 2026; 8 (1) :1-3
URL: http://ijethics.com/article-1-431-en.html
Department of Clinical Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Science, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran. , sknd40@gmail.com
Abstract:   (26 Views)
Moral neutrality in great crises is not a neutral state but a normative choice. This choice can arise from epistemic humility or the product of conservative expediency. The difference between the two becomes apparent in the individual's relationship to truth and good. If neutrality leads to the suspension of responsibility, the fixation of inequality, and the continuation of harm, it is unjustified from the perspective of practical ethics. It can only be justified if it is based on honest epistemic doubt or a strategy to prevent a greater evil while maintaining a commitment to truth-seeking and the common good. In great crises, the main issue is not "which side" the individual takes; It is whether one takes a moral stand in the face of suffering and injustice. Silence in the face of oppression, if it is foreseeable that it will continue, is no longer neutrality; it is a covert form of participation. This conclusion is based not on emotions but on an analysis of the relationship between truth, goodness, and responsibility.
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Type of Study: Editorial | Subject: Special
Received: 2026/05/18 | Accepted: 2026/05/18 | Published: 2026/05/18

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